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In the Supreme Court 
MAX MARKUS 
of the 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, and 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TION, Utah Copper Division, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 8512 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, Max Markus, is a middle aged man of forty 
seven ( 47) years with a grammar school education and was, 
prior to his injury, a laborer by occupation. Plaintiff has no 
trade or skill with which to earn a living that does not require 
the use of his back (R. 48 & 49). 
On or about the 17th day of June, 1952, plaintiff was in 
the employ of Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Copper 
Division, one of the defendants herein, at Bingham Canyon, 
3 
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Utah, as a track hand in the open pit copper mine. While 
engaged in said employment on said date plaintiff suffered 
an injury to his back when a rail, which he was carrying to-
gether with eleven ( 11) other men on the track gang, was 
dropped without warning to the plaintiff (R. 5, 14, 29 & 96). 
That on October 27, 1952, the Industrial Commission deter-
mined that a surgical procedure was necessary to correct 
plaintiff's complaints of his back injury (R. 16). On or about 
April 1, 1953, an operation was performed on his back by 
Dr. Pemberton (R. 29, 31 & 50). Upon return to work, plain-
tiff suffered injuries to his back on two (2) other occasions: 
Once while shoveling snow, and again by slipping on a trail 
(R. 98, 100 & 101). 
On June 19, 1954, plaintiff again appeared before the 
Medical Advisory Board and it was determined that plaintiff 
must have another operation on his back (R. 33 & 34). The 
Commission granted to plaintiff his choice of doctor, to wit: 
Dr. Reed S. Clegg, orthopedic surgeon (R. 35). Another spine 
fusion operation was performed on the plaintiff on the 8th 
day of September, 1954, by Dr. Clegg (R. 74). This was the 
third operation on his back, plaintiff having been operated 
upon in 1949, arising out of a back injury suffered while work-
ing on a construction job prior to his employment by Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation (R. 83). 
On July 30, 1955, the Medical Advisory Board determined 
plaintiff's permanent partial loss of bodily function at twenty-
five per cent (25%) (R. 40). 
A formal hearing was requested and said hearing was duly 
held on the 27th day of October, 1955, where the issue to be 
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determined was plaintiff's extent of permanent partial dis-
ability (R. 46 & 47). 
The medical evidence adduced at said hearing clearly set 
forth the basic fact that the back is synonymous and equal to 
the body as a whole (R. 63 & 74), and a disability rating 
of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the back is equivalent to 
twenty-five per cent (25%) disability of total bodily function 
(R. 75). 
The medical evidence further adduced the uncontroverted 
fact that a twenty-five per cent (25%) permanent partial 
disability of the back (or bodily function) was a more serious 
disability than the loss of a person's thumb at the metacarpal 
bone (R. 64 & 75). The loss of a thumb at the metacarpal 
bone is a scheduled loss entitling a person to an award of 
sixty ( 60) weeks. (Title 35-1-66, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
Upon conclusion of said hearing, on the 9th day of Janu-
ary, 1956, the Industrial Commission adopted the Recom-
mended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the 
Referee and ordered Kennecott Copper Corporation to pay the 
said Max Markus fifty (50) weeks of compensation, together 
with medical and hospital expenses. Said fifty (50) weeks' 
compensation was based on a finding of twenty-five per cent 
(25%) loss of bodily function (R. 86 & 87). 
The Industrial Commission's arrival of fifty (50) weeks' 
compensation is based solely upon a mathematical calculation 
of what twenty-five per cent (25%) is to two hundred (200) 
weeks (the maximum award for permanent partial disability) 
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An application for rehearing was duly filed by plaintiff 
asserting that the award made was based upon a misinterpre-
tation of applicable law and was wholly unsubstantiated by 
the facts in the case (R. 88). Said application for rehearing 
was denied (R. 90). Hence plaintiff's present application for 
Writ of Certiorari for review of the case (R. 104 & 108). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT NO. I. 
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF FIFTY (50} WEEKS' COMPENSATION IS GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE AND INEQUITABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
DISABILITY AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
IS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN THE DETERMI-
NATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SAID AWARD. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. I. 
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL C011MISSIO:N 
OF FIFTY (50} WEEKS' COMPENSATION IS GROSSLY 
INADEQUATE AND INEQUITABLE FOR PLAINTIFF'S 
DISABILITY AND IS NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. 
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A careful and complete rev1ew of the record will con-
clusively show an absolute and complete absence of any evi-
dence supporting the Commission's ridiculously low award of 
only fifty (50) weeks' compensation for plaintiff's twenty-five 
per cent (25%) loss of bodily function. 
The record shows, on the other hand, th~t the plaintiff 
is a middle-aged man of forty-seven ( 47) years, has only a 
fifth grade education, a laborer by occupation and a man of 
no skills or training to provide a livelihood without the use 
of his back (R. 48 & 49). The plaintiff has received extremely 
unsympathetic treatment and poor diagnosis of injury and 
recommended treatment from defendant company's doctors 
(R. 29). He has had to constantly employ all of his legal 
remedies through the Industrial Commission in order to re-
ceive temporary total disability and adequate surgery and 
medical care (R. 35 & 36). He is now industrially unemploy-
able and is admittedly of great handicap and disability as 
clearly shown by defendant's own company doctor in a letter 
written on March 29, 1955, to his superiors and incorporated 
in the Report of Hearing as Exhibit #1 (R. 83). For your 
convenience, your writer will quote from this letter, as follows: 
" ... Mr. Max Markus, Payroll Number 1143, was 
in my office yesterday March 28th, 1955, to obtain a 
release for light work at the Mines. 
"This employee has had three previous fusion oper-
ations on his spine. He is now under the care of Dr. 
Reed S. Clegg, Salt Lake City, Utah, and although I 
have a letter from Dr. Clegg advising that Mr. Markus 
be given light work, I feel Dr. Cle_gg does not appre-
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"It has been my experience that a patient such as 
Max Markus, could get an exacerbation of his back 
symptoms by getting on and off a train, slipping or 
tripping over a rock or a rail, or numerous other ways. 
Because of this I can not honestly release this man for 
either regular or light work. 
'The above was explained fully to the patient, as 
well as the reasons on which my opinion was based. 
Sincerely, 
H. C. JENKINS, M.D." 
The only scheduled loss in Title 35-1-66, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, which is at all comparable to a disability 
rating of fifty (50) weeks is the loss of one ( 1) thumb and 
the metacarpal bone thereof which gives rise to sixty ( 60) 
weeks' compensation. Both Dr. Jenkins, defendant company's 
physician, and Dr. Reed S. Clegg, an orthopedic surgeon, 
clearly expressed opinions that plaintiff's twenty-five per cent 
(25%) loss of bodily function was more serious than the 
above named scheduled loss (R. 64 & 75). In fact, plaintiff's 
loss was more comparable to the scheduled loss of one ( 1) 
arm at or near the shoulder which gives rise to an award of 
two hundred (200) weeks (R. 64 & 75) . 
It is common knowledge and established without contra-
diction of medical evidence adduced at the hearing that a one 
hundred per cent (100%) loss of function of a person's back 
is equal to one hundred per cent ( 100%) loss of bodily 
function and that twenty-five per cent (25%) loss of function 
of the back (instant case) is equal to twenty-five per cent 
(25%) loss of bodily function (R. 63, 74 & 75). The Legis-
lature has recognized that the loss of an arm at the shoulder 
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is not total disability and has rated said loss at two hundred 
( 200) weeks. The Court can, therefore, actually take judicial 
notice of the fact that plaintiff's disability rating of twenty-
five per cent (25%) loss of bodily function is greater than 
twenty-five per cent (25%) loss of function of one ( 1) arm. 
A proper evaluation of the disability of this man would be to 
determine the amount of compensation for permanent total 
disability and then take twenty-five per cent (25%) of said 
total disability '!S the award to be made, but not to exceed two 
hundred ( 200) weeks, the maximum award for permanent 
partial disability. 
POINT NO. II. 
THE AWARD OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
IS BASED UPON AN ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION 
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW IN THE DETERMI-
NATION OF THE AMOUNT OF SAID AWARD. 
The Industrial Commission has adopted the rule of de-
termining the amount of an award for permanent partial dis-
ability in this case involving a back injury of an unscheduled 
loss by the simple use of an arbitrary and inequitable arith-
metical computation. In other words, the Industrial Commis-
sion takes the maximum amount of permanent partial disability 
of two hundred ( 200) weeks as set up by statute and multi-
plies said maximum by the amount of determined percentage 
loss of bodily function. For example, it has been found that 
the amount of bodliy function of the plaintiff herein is twenty-
five per cent ( 2 5%), therefore, two hundred ( 200) weeks 
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multiplied by twenty-five per cent (25%) equals fifty (50) 
weeks. 
The main issue of this appeal is therefore quite clear. 
Has the Industrial Commission correctly interpreted the law 
applicable in the determination of the amount of said award 
in the instant case? 
The applicable provision of Title 35-1-66, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, is as follows: 
"For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily 
function not otherwise provided for herein, such period 
of compensation as the commission shall deem equit-
able and in proportion as near as may be to compensa-
tion for specific loss as set forth in the schedule in this 
section but not exceeding in any case two hundred 
weeks. 
"The amounts specified in this section are all subject 
to the limitations as to the maximum weekly amount 
payable as specified in this section, and in no event 
shall more than a total of $6250.00 be required to be 
paid." 
In the case of injuries to the back, injuries to the head, 
or injuries to other vital organs of the body, not specifically 
scheduled by the Legislature, an interpretation of the above 
statute as the Industrial Commission has given to it leads to 
great inconvenience to persons suffering such injuries and yields 
apparent inequitable and absurd consequences. To fully illus-
trate the point, suppose a man had seventy-five per cent (75%) 
permanent loss of bodily function of the back. For practical 
purposes such a man would be nearly, or if not so, totally 
disabled. Yet a single arithmetical computation would yield 
10 
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only one hundred fifty (150) weeks of compensation, or the 
same as the loss of one ( 1) hand in the scheduled losses. 
It is stated in 58 Am. Jur. 28 at page 594, as follows: 
"When great inconvenience of absurd consequences 
will result from a particular construction, that con-
struction should be avoided, unless the meaning of the 
legislature be so plain and manifest that avoidance is 
impossible." 
It has been clearly enunciated by the Supreme Court of 
Utah that statutes dealing with the Workmen's Compensation 
Act must be liberally constru_ed. See Chandler vs. Industrial 
Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 Pac. 1020, 8 ALR 930, wherein 
said Act was construed in favor of employees and death bene-
ficiaries. 
In another early case of North Beck Mining Company v. 
Industrial Commission, 58 Utah 486, 200 Pac. 111, 112, Justice 
Weber said in a unanimous opinion, as follows: 
"The Industrial Act, including the procedure therein 
provided, must be liberally construed, and with the 
purpose of effectuating its beneficent and humane ob-
jects." 
This case also stressed the man's occupation (a miner) 
m determining the award and the Court even took judicial 
notice of his loss. 
A careful reading of the statute with the above legal 
guides of interpretation in mind clearly shows that the Legis-
lature intended, in the case of unscheduled losses, for the 
Industrial Commission to arrive at a fair and equitable award 
and to use the scheduled losses only as a guide as to comparable 
11 
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seriousness with the limitation that the lJ?.aximum award for 
any unscheduled loss should not exceed two hundred ( 200) 
weeks. As in the insta~t case the Industrial Commission should 
have attempted to compare the seriousness of twenty-five per 
cent (25%) loss of bodily injury of a laborer to a comparable 
scheduled loss of equal seriousness and not consider two hun-
dred (200) weeks as equivalent to total loss of bodily function. 
We invite the Court's attention to one of its own cases 
which is directly in point with the instant case and because of 
its importance we are compell~d to quote at length from the 
case of Silver King Coalition Mines Company vs. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 511, 69 P. 2d 608, wherein Justice Wolfe 
in a unanimous decision discusses the issue at hand and very 
effectively sets forth the correct interpretation of this statute 
and the reasons therefore. We quote from pages 613 and 614 
of the Pacific Reporter citation above: 
" ... The compensation for permanent partial dis-
ability is measured either by the schedule or in propor-
tion thereto and as deemed equitable on the loss of 
bodily functions alone, and the maximum is 200 weeks. 
But if the applicants claims total and permanent dis-
ability the issue is as to whether he is totally and per-
manently disabled industrially and economically. There 
is a twilight zone where one blends into the other. 
That is, the loss of bodily function may be so great 
as to leave one totally and permanently disabled in-
dustrially. Thus a person with a 90 per cent. loss of 
bodily function might be able to prove himself totally 
and permanently disabled. If so, he would take him-
self out of the class of applicants limited to recover 
under the paragraph of section 42-1-62, above quoted, 
and put himself in the class where his compensation 
12 
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should be determined by his total lack of industrial or 
economical ability. But until that point is reached, the 
permanent partial disability is seemingly compensated 
for on loss of bodily function alone with a maximum 
of 200 weeks. The fact that a workman may stop in 
the zone of permanent partial, not quite going over 
into the zone of permanent total, and therefore obtain 
a maximum of only 200 weeks, whereas, a trifle more 
disability would bring him into what the commission 
might find as a fact to be an industrial or economic 
permanent total giving him 260 weeks plus 45 per cent. 
for the remainder of his life, leads us to wonder 
whether this 200 weeks' maximum is supposed to be 
the equivalent to a total loss of bodily function as the 
commission seemed to conceive it in this case. The 
applicant had a loss of bodily function of 70 per cent. 
The commission, therefore, gave him 140 weeks' com-
pensation on the theory evidently that if he had 100 
per cent. loss of bodily function he would have been 
entitled to 200 weeks. But certainly if he had had a 
100 per cent. loss of bodily function he would have 
been totally permanently disabled industrially and eco-
nomically and therefore be entitled to compensation 
for the rest of his life. 
"There is nothing in the last paragraph of section 
42-1-62 which requires that the number of weeks of 
compensation to be given under this paragraph for per-
manent partial disability shall be to 200 weeks as the 
loss of bodily function is to the full bodily function. 
The requirement is that it shall be as the 'commission 
shall deem equitable,' circumscribed by the require-
ment that it be in proportion to compensation in other 
cases. The maximum contained in the schedule is 200 
weeks for the loss of an arm. The loss of an arm would 
not be a total loss of bodily function. It is therefore 
odd that in the unscheduled types of loss of bodily 
member or loss of bodily function the commission 
13 
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should assume that the maximum of 200 weeks is to 
be taken as the equivalent of a total loss of bodily 
function. It would not seem to be necessary for a person 
to have a 70 per cent. loss of bodily function to obtain 
140 weeks of compensation. He might have such per-
centage of loss and obtain 200 weeks if the loss of 
function was comparable to the loss of function suf-
fered by the loss of an arm at or near the shoulder or 
comparable thereto. And, put in another way, the ap-
plicant in this case might suffer a 50 per cent. loss of 
bodily function and be granted 140 weeks if it was 
comparable to the loss of a leg between the knee and 
the ankle, which yields in the schedule 140 weeks, 
because it must be in 'proportion to the compensation 
in other cases'; such loss of a leg being one of the 
other cases. Or, if it were somewhat less than the 
equivalent of the loss of function entailed by the loss 
of a hand, which yields 158 weeks, it would be in pro-
portion. The mere fact that there was medical testimony 
that the loss was 50 per cent. of the full bodily function 
would not necessarily make an award of 140 weeks 
erroneous. Perhaps the loss of a leg between the knee 
and the ankle does not involve more than 50 per cent. 
loss of total bodily function" ... 
CONCLUSION 
The instant case is of great importance, not only to plaintiff 
herein, who is seeking his proper and just relief, but also to all 
other injured employees who may follow him with injuries to 
vital organs of the body and not listed as a scheduled loss. 
This is especially true in this era where back injuries are com-
ing before the Industrial Commission with greater frequency 
14 
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due to better diagnostic and surgical procedures developed by 
the orthopedic surgeons. 
The full use of a person's back is of great importance and 
especially is this true of a laborer. Once a man has had a back 
operation and has not been re-employed by his employer, as 
in this case, he practically finds it impossible to obtain new 
employment wherein the full use of the back is of any im-
portance. Employers refuse to take chances on employees with 
back injuries. 
Here in this case the Industrial Commission has made an 
award which is not supported by evidence, and such an award 
is inequitable and has led to a great injustice to the plaintiff 
and to an absurd consequence. That the interpretation of the 
applicable law in this case as made by the Industrial Com-
mission is erroneous and not in keeping with the interpretation 
as set forth by this Court. 
In the interst of justice to the plaintiff and of others to 
follow him, this writer urges the Honorable Supreme Court 
to carefully inspect the record and judiciously read the applic-
able statute and return this case to the Industrial Commission 
for a determination of a just and equitable award with the 
proper instructions as to the manner of accomplishing same. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAHL AND SAGERS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
EVERETT E. DAHL 
VICTOR G. SAGERS 
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